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THE ROLE OF LIMITS IN ARISTOTLE’S 
CONCEPT OF PLACE 
Jacqueline Marifia 
Yale University 
In this paper I hope to elucidate some considerations govern- 
ing Aristotle’s notion of place as developed in the Physics. It 
is, in fact, these considerations which betray the profound 
nature of Aristotle’s thought with respect to this issue, even 
though his own solution to the problem of place is itself highly 
inadequate. 
Aristotle begins his discussion of place with the words, “For 
everyone supposes that things that are are somewhere, be- 
cause what is not is nowhere-where, for instance, is a goat- 
stag or a sphinx?”’ This assertion is full of meaning, at once 
delimiting and channeling at the outset the direction of Aris- 
totle’s thoughts about place. A distinction is introduced in 
passing between that which can be thought, but which is not 
(such as a goat-stag or a sphinx) and that which is. That which 
is must be somewhere; being somewhere or having a place is 
thus a necessary precondition for our predicating objective (as 
opposed to merely ideal) reality to a thing. This condition 
thereby serves as a criterion through which to distinguish be- 
tween objectively real and imaginary entities. This thought is 
not explicitly taken up again by Aristotle in his discussion of 
place, but it relates in important ways to the rest of the dis- 
cussion; in fact, it serves as a presupposition through which 
Aristotle rejects both Platonic and Atomistic understandings 
of space. 
Aristotle’s assertion is reminiscent of Plato’s words in the 
Timaeus at 52b, “And there is a third nature, which is space 
and is eternal . . . which we, beholding as in a dream, say of 
all existence that it must of necessity be in some place and 
occupy a space, but that  which is neither in heaven nor in 
earth has no existence.”2 Hence, Aristotle’s words are not only 
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a general remark concerning place, but at the same time serve 
to underline differences between his own physical realism and 
Plato’s philosophy, which assigned a kind of reality to space 
itself, but denied it to the appearances in  space.3 
Aristotle’s next consideration concerning place can also be 
illuminated by placing it in the context of his debate with 
Plato. Aristotle writes: “Of change, the most general and basic 
kind is change of place, which we call locom~tion.”~ For Plato, 
the amorphous substratum of space acquires a quasi reality 
precisely because space itself does not change, whereas the 
appearances which succeed each other in space do. Space as 
an  unchangeable substratum must thereby be more real, for 
unchangeability, according to this view, is the ultimate cri- 
terion for what is real. The things in space, precisely because 
they succeed each other in place (that is, they “become in place 
and vanish out of p l a ~ e ” ~ )  are not apprehended by mind, but 
are the subject matter of true opinion; they are the change- 
able, and as such not absolutely real. While it is not easy to 
gauge what precisely Plato had in mind in staking out this 
position, what he meant can be illumined through one of his 
own metaphors. Imagine, for instance, a screen, or the wall 
inside the cave of Plato’s Republic. Given only this limited 
amount of space on which shadows succeed each other, the 
wall itself would seem to be that which is most real, since the 
play of flickering images and shadows reflected upon it are 
in a constant state of becoming, such that it is impossible to 
identify an image as itself perduring through time and as the 
subject of change. Were this metaphor literally applicable to 
our apprehension of appearances, we could only have real 
knowledge of the substratum (i.e., the wall) on which these 
images appear, for only this substratum could be said to be 
continuously identifiable. The images themselves would be 
more difficult to identify continuously, since not only would 
they be in a constant state of becoming, but a t  times they 
would disappear completely from view, only to appear later on 
at another moment, but with no continuity between their dis- 
appearance and reappearance. Thus the subject of change 
would be the substratum on which the images appear, with 
the images themselves being merely accidental qualities of the 
substratum, i.e., that which changes of the substratum.6 
It is with this Platonic perspective in mind that we must 
gauge the revolutionary nature of Aristotle’s physical realism, 
and it is in this context of Aristotle’s debate with Plato that 
we are to make sense of Aristotle’s assertion that the most 
general and basic kind of change is change of place. In oppo- 
sition to the view that space is more real than the things 
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appearing in it and that it is a kind of receptacle for the ideas, 
we have the view that physical bodies change in respect of 
place. But to say that a physical body changes in respect of 
place, that this is the most basic sort of change, is to say some- 
thing very different from Plato. For change presupposes the 
identity with itself of that which changes; change of place is 
the most basic kind of change because it preserves all the 
qualities of a thing (both substantial and accidental) except 
for location; it is the change most preserving of the identity 
of the thing which changes, that is, doing the least violence 
to the identity of the changing thing. Thus a major shift in 
thought has taken place; instead of asserting that space is 
most real because unchangeable, the things in space are 
thought of as real, and as identifiable despite change of place. 
Place thereby becomes the most accidental property that can 
be ascribed to a thing; in asserting the ongoing identifiability 
of a thing despite its change with respect to place, a whole new 
paradigm has been introduced. No longer is space itself that 
which is most substantial, so that what appears in space is 
accidental to it, but the things in space are themselves sub- 
stantial, that is, preserving their identity despite change of 
place. 
At 208b 1 a parallel consideration is introduced, one which, 
however, moves in an opposite direction, thereby revealing the 
dialectical nature of Aristotle’s thought. Whereas in the first 
paragraph place is related to the most basic kind of change 
(locomotion), thus showing place to be the most accidental 
property that can be predicated of a substantial entity, the sec- 
ond paragraph adduces considerations in favor of the reality 
of place. These, however, already assume what has been estab- 
lished before, namely, the substantiality of physical bodies. 
Thus that place has some sort of reality itself independent of 
things in place “seems to  be clear from replacement: where 
there is now water, the air in turn is.”7 That is, place is itself 
continually identifiable despite the succession of things inhab- 
iting it. Moreover, the continued identifiability of place apart 
from things in place is known precisely through replacement; 
were there no change of substantial entities from one place 
to another, we should assume place to be equivalent to matter, 
that is, to the material extension of things occupying space. 
It is only because things change place that we think of place 
as some sort of three-dimensional extension independent of 
the material extension of things in place. But this in turn 
means that in order to have any notion of place as something 
knowable independently from what occupies it, we must first 
possess a notion of substantial entities which change place. 
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Relating this back to our previous discussion (cf. in particular 
Cherniss’s observation quoted in note 6 of this paper), this 
means that Plato can have no independent notion of xhpa 
because it is itself constituted by particular &rot, themselves 
defined in terms of the phenomena appearing as manifesta- 
tions of space. It is, in fact, this very basic presupposition of 
Plato’s that  Aristotle argues against when he states that  place 
can be neither the form nor the matter of a thing.8 For if we 
accept Plato’s understanding of space, then space (xhpa) is in- 
deed amorphous matter, while place ( T ~ T O S  can be conceived 
of as either the matter or form of a n  appearance, depending 
on how one looks at the problem.9 %TOP can be thought of in 
terms of matter when one thinks of it as extension itself (once 
the limits defining place have been abstracted);1° on the other 
hand, place is most properly defined by these limits them- 
selves, even though the material substrate, i.e., extension, 
must be presupposed as the condition of the possibility that  
these limits define any thing. It is important to note that Plato 
does not think of place simply as local position;ll in fact, 
Plato’s r h o s  can hardly mean this a t  all since position pre- 
supposes some thing which is in position. For Plato, however, 
the ~ 6 . 7 ~ 0 ~  as the limit of the appearance, is precisely that 
which defines the appearance. Once more this underlines the 
substantial departure of Aristotle from Platonic thought, in 
particular with respect to Aristotle’s physical realism, wherein 
substantial entities can suffer change (in particular change of 
place) while preserving their identity. This means that the 
form and matter of a n  entity, as intrinsic to the identity of 
a thing, cannot be identified with the place of a thing, for a 
body preserves its identity while changing place.’* 
Just  how much Aristotle’s arguments are intended as a 
refutation of the Platonic notion of place can be noted through 
an  analysis of the difficult passage at 209a 7ff.: 
Again, since a body has a place and a space, it is clear that a surface does 
too, and the other limits, for the same argument will apply: where previously 
the surfaces of the water were, there will be in turn those of the air. Yet we 
have no distinction between a point and the place of a point; so that  if not 
even a point’s place is different [from itself] then neither will the place of any 
of the others be, nor will place be something other than each of these.13 
This passage can be interpreted in various ways, its most 
obvious sense being the following. Assuming, on the Platonic 
model, that place is the three-dimensional configuration of an  
extended appearance, such that the surfaces of the appearance 
are not only its limits (as that which defines the appearance), 
but its r d ~ o s  as well, then, since any surface is itself analyz- 
able into lines and points, there will be no distinction between 
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a point and the place of a point, for all the points of the 
limiting surfaces are themselves constitutive of the definition 
of the geometric form of the appearance as well as of its place. 
On this view, a point (since it is constitutive of the appear- 
ance) cannot serve as a n  abstractable reference point through 
which to determine the local position of an  appearance.14 Thus 
such a theory arrives a t  no scientifically useful notion of place 
whereby objects can be related to one another via their posi- 
tion relative to one another. Moreover, if we accept Aristotle’s 
view that both a body and its surfaces must have a place (for 
anything that is, is in place), and if the surfaces limiting an  
appearance are identified with T ~ T T O S ,  then we shall have to 
search for the place of a place, i.e., the place of the surfaces, 
geometrically conceived, delimiting a body. Another argument 
against the view that place can be identified with the termini 
of quantity (i.e., the surfaces, the lines, and the points) delim- 
iting a thing is that since objects obviously change places, 
were we to accept such a definition, places would change places; 
this is because the surfaces of objects change place with them. 
Closely related to this concept of place which Aristotle 
refutes is another one, equally problematic, wherein place is 
considered as a given magnitude, or as an  interval between 
extremities. This view is similar to the one discussed above, 
with the exception that according to this understanding the 
interval or magnitude itself, while having the same geomet- 
rical configuration as the body that occupied it, remains be- 
hind while the body itself (as composed of both form and 
matter) moves along to a different place. The dependence of 
this view on the one formerly discussed is quite evident when 
one considers the difficult problem arising out of the relation- 
ship of the form of an  extension with extendedness itself; 
while both are different concepts and can be thought to refer 
to different things, neither one can be thought of without the 
other. Limits without the extensions which they define would 
collapse into a single point, while pure extendedness without 
limits is as impossible to conceive as the infinite. Thus the 
notion of place as an  interval is very much dependent on 
Aristotle’s discussion of the interrelations between form and 
matter; matter can be defined through abstraction, for 
instance, “when the limit and properties of the sphere are re- 
moved, nothing is left but the matter.”15 However, as Aristotle 
himself notes, “it is not easy to recognize [matter and form] 
in separation from one another.”16 By the same token, Aristotle 
does not have a notion of space without limits, and so when 
Aristotle attempts to conceive of place as something apart from 
the form of the object which occupied the place, he gets into 
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difficulties precisely because he cannot consider place in ab- 
straction from the limits which define it. 
As Ross notes, “It is clear that the view that Aristotle is here 
opposing is not the view that there is one single space, dis- 
tinguishable from the bodies that occupy it and move about 
in it.”17 In other words, insofar as his discussion of place goes, 
Aristotle does not consider the notion of one space from which 
all things in space can be abstracted. An analysis of Aristotle’s 
rejection of a void may perhaps also include a rejection of this 
view, but the following may be considered reasons why Aristotle 
so completely overlooks this notion of space in his discussion 
of T ~ T O F .  The notion of a single space abstracted from every- 
thing in it is not only difficult to conceive because no thing 
without limits can actually be thought, but because pure emp- 
ty space has no identifiable places outside of the things which 
might occupy it. In order for the mind to be able to know some- 
thing, this thing must be distinguished from something else; 
hence, delimitation, wherein at least two objects define one 
another, must be presupposed. Otherwise we should be as lost 
as on that famous night when all cows were black. However, 
pure empty space has no limitations, there no thing distin- 
guishes itself from something else; there are, in effect, no 
things which can be apprehended, and no reference points. In 
other words, from a phenomenological point of view, there are 
no positions or places (and therefore no reference points) aside 
from things or already delimited extensions which can serve 
as reference points. Physics must thereby concern itself with 
a notion of place, not of space, for place is identifiable in virtue 
of things surrounding it and allowing it to be picked out as 
a particular something. This, however, means that place has 
limits; it has, in other words, a certain shape through which 
it can be identified and referred to the objects surrounding it. 
Thus Aristotle tells us that a thing must be equal to its place 
(in magnitude) and that “this kind of place is the primary 
place in which it is.”l8 Moreover, Aristotle tells us that “it is 
because it surrounds that form is thought to be place, for the 
extremes of what surrounds and of what is surrounded are in 
the same [spot]. They are both limits, but not of the same 
thing: the form is the limit of the object, and the place of the 
surrounding body.”lg 
In the end, Aristotle’s final definition of place will attempt 
to incorporate many of the considerations outlined above which 
this second view of place (i.e., place as a given magnitude) also 
addresses; however, Aristotle rejects this second view because 
of the many antinomies which it generates. It should, how- 
ever, be noted that in accepting these considerations as valid 
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for a viable conception of place, Aristotle is already committed 
to a view which reifies place in such a way that it is impos- 
sible to avoid an  endless regress of places within places, or 
of places which change places. Not only this second view, but 
Aristotle’s own definition of place is susceptible to this crit- 
icism. This is true given the following general considerations: 
(1) once place has been defined in terms of limits, one has, 
in effect, “placed” a place, for a limit is not a place (nor can 
it serve to constitute a place), but itself requires a place; (2) 
difficulties abound when these limits are in some way at- 
tached to the things inhabiting space. It is clear that although 
limits can be abstracted from the things of which they are 
limits, we should have no notion of limits apart from things 
which delimit one another. More importantly, however, these 
limits can in fact serve our purposes of allowing us to “place” 
objects with respect to one another only if they are attached 
to some real thing in the world that remains relatively fixed. 
The fact, however, that so many things are in motion will pre- 
sent real difficulties for Aristotle’s conception of place. 
In order to elucidate some of the thoughts outlined above, 
let us consider once more the view which Aristotle rejects, 
namely, that of place as a given magnitude separable from 
the object which occupies it. It is important to note that on 
this view the givenness of place as a magnitude depends upon 
the limits once defined by the surfaces of the object which 
occupied it. These limits cannot be abstracted from the mag- 
nitude without destroying the definition of the magnitude as 
this magnitude; when a magnitude is no longer defined as a 
particular magnitude, it is no longer a magnitude a t  all. 
However, as Aristotle notes, were these definite magnitudes 
( 6 ~ a a ~ i p a ~ a ) ,  considered apart from the body inhabiting them, 
to exist, many problems would result; e.g., not only might we 
have concentrically overlapping places, but places might also 
be thought to change places. Why this is the case is explained 
by Aristotle a t  the very difficult and somewhat muddled pas- 
sage at 211b 14ff.: 
And because the thing surrounded and divided off often moves about while 
the surrounding thing remains (e.g., water leaves a vessel), what is in 
between is thought to be something, on the supposition that there is some 
extension over and above the body which changes position. (But that is not 
so: what happens is that whatever body it may chance to be, of those that 
change position and are such as to be in contact, comes in. If there were 
some extension which was what was naturally [there] and static, there 
would be infinitely many places in the same spot. For, when the water and 
air change position, all the parts will do the same thing in the whole as 
all the water does in the vessel, and at the same time the place will be 
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moving about; so that the place will have another place and there will be 
many places together.20 
The best way to approach Aristotle’s argument is by visual- 
izing what he is talking about. Once more it should be remem- 
bered that the 8muripara of which he speaks are in all cases 
definite intervals, defined and made particular by the limits 
surrounding them. In the case of the 8 ~ a a ~ i p a r a  these inter- 
vals are defined not by the form per se of the body inhabit- 
ing them, but by the surfaces of the container which are 
thought to be their place. Imagine, then, a bucket filled with 
water (diagram A). Now supposing that half the water were 
poured out of the vessel (diagram B) we should have two dif- 
ferent 8lOUTipCYTa defined by the place of the water, and, in 
fact, since the two S i a u ~ i p a ~ a  overlap, we should be left with 
the strange situation of a place inside a place. 
Interval 1 (ABCDEFGH) is defined by the containing sur- 
faces of the bucket, and the surface of the air which forms the 
plane ABCD. The same is true, respectively, of interval 2 
(EFGHIJKL). However, interval 2 is different from interval 1, 
for according to this view, the identity of an  interval is close- 
ly tied up with its form. These intervals cannot themselves 
define place. This is because, simply from their definition (in- 
sofar as this relates to their form), we should never know that 
the two intervals partly coincide; we know of this coincidence 
through a knowledge of place extrinsic to the definition of 
these intervals as “places” and as particular and identifiable 
intervals. Moreover, according to this view, any thing in place 
itself defines a new interval so that, if, for instance, the bucket 
of water were tipped sideways, the form of the water as de- 
fined by the surfaces of the bucket and air which surround 
it would create a new 61aaripara and therefore a new place 
(diagram C). 
In his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Thomas Aquinas 
sheds some light on this obscure passage when he writes: 
But if there could be some intermediate containing space, which is other 
than the dimensions of the contained body, and which always remains in 
the same place, then this inconsistency would follow-an infinite number 
of places would be together. This is so because since water or air or any 
body or any part of a body would have proper dimensions, then every part 
will do the same thing in the whole as the water does in the vase. According 
to the position of those who believe in space, while the water as a whole 
is in the vase, there are other dimensions of space besides the dimensions 
of the water. However, every part is contained by the whole as that which 
is located is contained by the vase. They differ only in that the part is not 
divided, while that which is located is divided. Therefore if a part is actually 
divided, it follows that other dimensions of the whole container are there 
besides the dimensions of the part.21 
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Thomas’s commentary serves to elucidate yet another dif- 
ficulty that arises out of the view of place as self-subsistent 
Staoripcu~a, namely, that since any part of the water which 
is itself divisible will constitute a n  interval, there will be 
places within places, since the interval constituted by the di- 
visible part of the water will itself be in the container. This 
can be seen by referring to diagrams A and B above: dia- 
gram B contains a part of the water represented in diagram 
A, yet although according to this view the water in  diagram 
B can be thought of as in interval 2, this interval is itself 
in interval 1. Thus a series of concentric places has been gen- 
erated. This is the meaning of Thomas’s phrase, “then every 
part will do the same thing in  the whole as the water itself 
does in the vase.” 
Thomas’s commentary is revealing in that it shows why 
Aristotle wants to avoid the idea that a part continuous with 
that which surrounds it has a place. Aristotle writes: 
So that when that which surrounds is not divided from, but continuous with, 
[the thing surrounded], the latter is said to be in the former not as in a 
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place but as the part is in the whole; but when that which surrounds is 
divided from and in contact with [the thing surrounded], the latter is in the 
extreme of the surrounding thing first.. . . And if the thing surrounded is 
continuous it is moved not in [the surrounding thing] but with it; if it is 
divided, it is moved in the latter-just as much, whether or not the 
surrounding thing is itself moved.22 
Any given part of the water would not, on Aristotle’s view, 
have a place, for it is surrounded by matter of the same kind 
as itself. Only when two bodies are contiguous can the sur- 
rounded body be said to have a place, and this requirement 
of actual contiguity will also imply that a place is not a self- 
subsistent interval, since the interval requires a surrounding 
body to define it. Contiguity, for Aristotle, is a special case of 
continuity, and not vice versa; as H. R. King notes, “the class 
of things continuous must not be looked upon as a species of 
things c0ntiguous.”~3 While contiguity presupposes continuity, 
it adds the further requirement that two distinct entities touch 
at their extremes. Whereas the parts of the water are continuous 
with one another, they are not contiguous to each other, and 
cannot, therefore, be thought of as each having its own place. 
The elimination of the idea that a part of a continuous body 
has a place partially serves to prevent the multiplication of 
concentric places, but this multiplication is only avoided if the 
notion of place as a self-subsistent interval is also jettisoned. 
Place therefore depends on two things, the notion of contigu- 
ity, and that which is implied by this notion, the actual phys- 
ical presence of that which surrounds. Only a body which is 
actually surrounding and contiguous with another body can 
be said to constitute its place. Place thus depends on the actual 
situation of real bodies in contact with one another. Here we 
arrive at Aristotle’s own first definition of place, i.e., place is 
the limit of the surrounding body.24 This eliminates all geomet- 
rical abstractions from actual situations in the notion of place. 
Aristotle’s own first definition of place is fraught with 
many problems which he himself recognizes, i.e., that  actual 
surrounding bodies are often themselves in movement. At 
212a 20 he revises his definition of place: “place is the first 
unchangeable limit of that  which surrounds.”25 This revised 
notion of place gives up the requirement that a place be equal 
in magnitude to the thing which occupies it; place is no longer 
a container but a fixed point. How can we make sense of 
Aristotle’s use of the word “limit” in this context, particularly 
in light of the fact that a n  “unchangeable limit” is often quite 
far removed from the thing for which it is supposed to serve 
as a place? In the case of the boat traveling downstream, for 
instance, the banks of the river, as well as its bed, would serve 
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the purpose of situating the boat. But are these really limits 
of the boat? Certainly they do not spatially define the geomet- 
rical configurations of the boat. But if this is the case, how 
are we to relate the banks of the river to the boat itself? What 
is the space through which these lines of relationship can be 
drawn? It is precisely a t  this point that Aristotle’s revised 
notion of place breaks down. 
Let me conclude with some general remarks which might get 
to the bottom of why Aristotle’s definition of place is so un- 
satisfactory. I began this essay with Aristotle’s contention 
that everything that is, is in place. Perhaps, had Aristotle 
thought more deeply about the ramifications of this statement, 
he might have arrived at a more satisfactory notion of place. 
For what this implies is that everything that is, being in a 
place, can be related to everything else that is. Such a pos- 
sibility of spatial relationship among things presupposes one 
space through which existing things can be related. In  virtue 
of its unitary nature, such a space could not be thought of as 
having limits, for to assign it limits would be, in fact, to 
“place” it in another, broader horizon of space. Aristotle would 
no doubt have serious qualms about the very possibility of 
thinking such a limitless space, some of which have been dis- 
cussed above. Yet words such as continuity and contiguity 
only make sense in virtue of such a horizon of one space. More- 
over, even Aristotle’s notion of place as a “first unchangeable 
limit of that which surrounds,” as far spatially removed as 
it can often be from that which it is supposed to place, can 
only have actual significance if that which is “in place” and 
that which is “the place of the thing” both exist in a single 
space; only when such a space is presupposed can lines of 
relationship between the two be drawn. As my analysis of the 
view$ that Aristotle refutes with such care has attempted to 
show, it is Aristotle’s finitism which has precluded him from 
considering such an  idea of space in place of his idea of T ~ O S .  
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